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As events in Europe continued to devolve after the Munich Pact of 1938, two 
influential, neutral states were becoming increasingly vocal in putting to an end the continent's 
downward spiral. The Vatican in Rome, led first by fiery Pope Pius XI before the succession of 
Pope Pius XII in March 1939, recognized a war would be catastrophic for Christianity in Europe, 
not to mention its fears of the tremendous loss of life which would be inflicted upon Europeans 
of all faiths. Across the Atlantic Ocean, President Franklin Roosevelt, hamstrung by isolationist 
policies imposed by Congress after involvement in the First World \'Var, understood the necessity 
of making his voice heard in the name of peace before it was too late. The Vatican and the United 
States indirectly worked with each other throughout 1939 before officially joining forces in early 
1940. 
It only made sense that the two collaborated with each other during this period. The 
Pope's moral authority over the millions of Catholics in Europe could not be ignored, and 
Europe was keeping a wary eye on an America that was potentially a sleeping tiger. Additionally, 
the Vatican felt American support would give its words-since words were all it had without an 
army of its own-more value to European leaders. The Roosevelt administration, on the other 
hand, believed the Vatican to be a source of vast intelligence on European affairs that could be 
mined, and much more importantly, the Pope could mitigate, if not silence altogether, the 
President's numerous detractors among the American Catholic hierarchy. 
The relationship evolved from first establishing quasi-official relations and voicing 
concerns over the possibility of war throughout 1939, to attempting to keep Italy out of the war 
in 1940, to finally convincing American Catholics to support Lend-Lease aid to Russia after its 
German invasion in 1941. The relationship would prove to be amicable, and although it would 
not stop the war, the coordinated diplomacy represented the last unified front to limit the number 
of participants. Once that also could not be achieved, Pius XII and Roose,·elt began to work to 
conclude the war as quickly as possible, including preparing isolationist American Catholics for 
intervention. The relationship would ultimately be much more fruitful for the United States than 
for the Vatican in terms of tangible results, but it was not a one-way street regarding benefits. 
Indeed, each side had its needs met in different ways, which is why for two years of official 
relations-plus 1939-the relationship was so important. 
Before expounding any further on the collaboration of these neutral sovereigns, the 
debate over the Vatican's purported silence over the Holocaust and other wartime atrocities (such 
as the indiscriminate Allied bombings of German cities) must be acknowledged, but it falls out of 
the purview of this study. There are numerous other works which address the issue, some of 
which might be described as either unfairly polemical or hopelessly apologetic. 1 Whether or not 
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the criticisms leveled against the Vatican for its post-1941 (in)actions are valid, analysis of its 
efforts alongside those of the United States to contain the scope of the war in Europe 
foreshadows the reticence of Pope Pius XII of which he would be accused in his handling of 
crimes against humanitv during the course of the war. Nevertheless, analysis will also show the 
Vatican's usefulness in aiding President Roosevelt's efforts for peace, and, ultimately, war. 
The path to diplomatic relations between the United States and the Vatican had been in 
the works for several years prior to 1940. Vatican Secretary of State Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli 
visited the United States in autumn of 1936, the highest ranking Vatican official to ever come to 
America. During the course of his tour, he met President Roosevelt--after the election for fear of 
angering Protestants-and the two men agreed to begin the process of establishing official 
relations.2 After the meeting, the Vatican made its voice heard on the world stage, impressing the 
United States. Pope Pius XI recognized the threat of Hitler and the National Socialist Party to the 
peace of Europe and to the existence of the Church. The persecution of the Catholic Church in 
Germany and the rearmament of that nation greatly troubled the Pontiff, so much so that he 
risked incurring even more of the Gestapo's wrath by issuing the encyclical Mit brennender So~ge 
(With Deep Anxiety) in .\{arch 1937. Described as "one of the greatest condemnations of a national 
regime ever pronounced by the Vatican," it denounced the neo-paganism extolled by the German 
state and the subjugation of all other creeds) The Nazis exacted revenge on the Church with 
attacks against both the clergy and laity, but the Pope refused to relent in his pronouncements 
against "exaggerated nationalism," and he would continue to speak out against Nazi policies for 
the remainder of his papacy.4 
Pius XI, however, was actually more concerned with the Communist menace emanating 
from the Soviet Union. Wbereas Germany allowed the practice of religion-at least for the time 
being-Red Russia denied religious freedom and systematically closed all but a few Catholic 
churches.s Pearing that Communism would spread westward, Pius XI issued yet another 
encyclical, Diz,ini Redemptoris, only five days after Mit Brennender So~ge. Just as he had condemned 
the neo-paganism of the Nazis, he vehemently spoke against the militant atheism of Communism, 
expounding that "Communism is intrinsically wrong, and no one who would save Christian 
civilization may collaborate '-Vith it in any undertaking whatsoever."6 This pronouncement would 
have important ramifications with the United States when Roosevelt attempted to convince 
American Catholics to support Lend-Lease aid to Russia in 1941. 
Knowing that the Vatican wanted a resumption of relations ever since the United States 
had severed ties in 1870, the initiative was placed solely in Roosevelt's hands, but the idea was 
politically risky in a nation traditionally wary of the papacy. Nevertheless, he did not away 
from the subject, broaching it in the summer of 1937 to entice Catholics to support revisions to 
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neutrality laws as well as in a speech that October expressing a desire for nations to isolate and cut 
ties with aggressor nations. The plan, the President told Chicago prelate George Cardinal 
Mundelein, would include the Vatican.7 
When Pius XI died in February 1939, the most important conclave of the century 
resulted with the election of Secretary of State Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli, who took the name Pius 
XII. The new pope had plenty of experience with diplomacy. For the nine years prior to his 
elevation to the papacy, Pacelli served as the Vatican's Secretary of State, the second highest 
position inside the Vatican. Throughout the turbulent 1930s, Pacelli and Pope Pius XI closely 
collaborated in formulating foreign policy for the Catholic Church.8 Even before his appointment 
to lead the Secretariat, Pacelli had spent all but his first two years as a priest serving in the Vatican 
bureaucracy. In February of 1917, Pope Benedict XV appointed him to become the nuncio 
(ambassador) to Munich, promptly making Pacelli a key figure in attempts to negotiate an end to 
the First World War. After the war, he remained Benedict's-and in early 1922, Pius Xl's-liaison 
to the Weimar Republic and moved to Berlin. His diplomatic skills provided the Vatican with 
more power oYer the German Church at the expense of the secular government. As he adapted to 
his role as Secretary of State in the 1930s, he firmly opposed the Communist menace which was 
evident in Russia, Mexico, and Spain.9 He also traveled extensively, visiting most all of Europe, 
crossing the Atlantic to South America, and, as previously mentioned, touring the United States. 
Undoubtedly, Cardinal Pacelli felt the pulse of world affairs firsthand. Historian John Cornwell 
argues that the Secretary of State continually appeased Hitler throughout the 1930s, but he fails to 
acknowledge that appeasement was the prevailing diplomatic approach to Hitler up through the 
conference at Munich in late 19 38. Therefore, the Vatican's efforts under Pacelli should be 
deemed no more (or less) contemptible than those of the English and French governments. 
Because of his previous experience with the German nation in the 1920s and his efforts 
as Pius XI's right-hand man as the Secretary of State, the English and French governments--each 
of which took the unusual step of speaking to their native Cardinals in order to influence their 
votes for Pacelli-welcomed the outcome, as did the United States, but Italy and Germany both 
feared he would continue his predecessor's policies. 10 The new Pope certainly sought to prevent 
another war just as his predecessor did, but Pius XII would prove to be much less forceful in his 
pronouncements than the recently-deceased Pontiff, preferting instead to adopt a more 
conciliatory manner. His less-aggressive approach to resolving European tensions quickly became 
evident. 
On March 12, 1939, one day after the papal coronation, Germany invaded 
Czechoslovakia. President Roosevelt had sent telegrams to Hitler and Mussolini requesting that 
they pledge a guarantee against further aggression a mere day before the invasion, but Pius XII 
refused to support the message due to the poor timing of it, and because it singled out the Axis 
for bearing the sole responsibility of maintaining the peace. Such support, the new, cautious Pope 
reasoned, would make the Vatican appear to be breaking its neutrality in favor of the \X' est. II 
While the United States had hoped for the moral reinforcement the· Holy See could provide, 
administration officials did not appear to be overly disappointed by the lack of cooperation. In 
fact, when the Vatican announced its plan for a conference of the five European powers in April, 
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some American officials in Europe believed it signified "belated collaboration" despite the 
purposely omitted invitation to America to participate.12 
The proposed conference, though, never materialized. Even though the Munich 
Conference the previous fall had been recognized as a thorough disaster, Pius XII na:ively, if not 
arrogantlv, believed he could broker peace with Hitler before a war could start. He was not 
without encouragement, however. Several members in the British and French governments were 
still willing to concede more to Hitler but could not say so publicly.n Furthermore, Secretary of 
State Luigi Cardinal Maglione knew that Mussolini did not want to go to war-at least not at this 
stage-and Maglione even attempted to enlist the dictator to mitigate Hitler's demands, but to no 
availY The United States was probably the most enthusiastic about the Pope's initiative. Cardinal 
Maglione made assurances that if the conference acmally convened, President Roosevelt's 
"assistance and co-operation" would be requested by Pius XII.15 American Under-Secretary of 
State Sumner Welles declared, "Regardless of the outcome of the attempts to bring about a 
conference of nations, the efforts of the Holy Father have been of the utmost value" because of 
his influence at a time of international crisis.I6 
The invitation to Roosevelt never had to be extended, because predictably, the idea fell 
apart. Mussolini announced that the tensions which might lead to war had effectively subsided, 
and thus there was no longer a need for the European powers to meet. Amazingly, the Vatican 
accepted this absurd notion and dropped its proposal on May 10, 1939.17 How <JUickly Pius XII 
discarded his proposal can only call into question his sincerity to see it come to fruition. If he and 
Secretary of State Maglione acmally believed the European simation had decreased in gravity, then 
both men were incredibly naive. This could hardly be the case, however, as both men were savvy 
enough after years of diplomatic experience to know that Hitler had more on his agenda than 
Czechoslovakia. The peace conference proposal has to be deemed an empty gesmre to show that, 
like his predecessor, Pius XII possessed a commitment to peace and that he was ,viJling to be the 
mediator. 18 Wben the simation clearly remained unsettled, though, letting the conference collapse 
without any objection was a curious way of sho,ving this desire. 
Perhaps more curious is that, in the Vatican's efforts to foster relations ·with the United 
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States, it snubbed the Americans for a conference which had little hope of ever taking place. The 
reason for not inviting the United States to the conference table can only be speculated, but it is 
likely that Pius XII did not believe an American presence would have been beneficial since the 
United States did not have a direct interest in the situation. Nevertheless, such a gesture certainly 
would have signaled the Vatican's seriousness for cooperation. Instead, it would seem relations 
between the two sovereigns were off to an inauspicious beginning. 
Roosevelt and the State Department bore no hard feelings, however, as the following 
month in June, Sumner Welles expressed to Washington's Apostolic Delegate, Archbishop 
Amleto Cicognani, the President's "wishes to co-operate with any Government or Power inclined 
to promote peace" and how Roosevelt "would be honored and pleased to receive suitable 
suggestions from the Holy See" in such an endeavor.t9 Despite the overture, Roosevelt remained 
unprepared to announce the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. The State Department, 
particularly Under-Secretary of State \'\Telles, prodded him to do so. Welles wrote that the 
relationship would be highly advantageous to the United States because "it is unquestionable that 
the Vatican has many sources of information, particularly with regard to what is actually going on 
in Germany, Italy, and Spain, which we do not possess."20 Ambassador to Italy William Phillips 
concurred, and he funher argued that America "would be supporting the Holy See in its well-
known effons to preserve peace in Europe at a moment of great tension."2t 
By October of 1939, a month after Germany's invasion of Poland, President Roosevelt 
made the decision to establish relations with the Vatican for the somewhat-disingenuous reason 
of working together to help place war refugees.22 That he had to devise such a poor excuse is 
indicative of the fear he had of the inevitable Protestant opposition to such a move. Francis 
Spellman, Archbishop of New York, reponed this to Rome, stating that Roosevelt "was looking 
for a moment and occasion for a persuasive appeal to the American people."23 The moment 
arrived just days before Christmas. Roosevelt personally wrote Pope Pius XII requesting His 
Holiness to accept i\Iyron Taylor as a personal representative of the President-as opposed to 
being an actual ambassador in charge of an embassy-"in order that our parallel endeavors for 
peace and the alleviation of suffering may be assisted.''24 After his first discussion with Roosevelt 
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just three years before had raised the possibility for official relations, the Pontiff was ecstatic that 
it was now a reality. He announced the news in his Christmas message, saying: 
Nothing could be more pleasing than this Christmas news as it signifies the coming 
from the Eminent Head of such a great and powerful nation and promising 
contribution to ... the attainment of a just and honourable peace and a more fruitful 
and widespread action to relieve the suffering of the victims of war.25 
The first nine months of Pius XII's papacy he displayed peculiar behavior towards the 
United States. He refused to endorse President Roosevelt's message calling for Hitler and 
Mussolini to cease their aggressive behavior, nor did he invite the United States to his proposed 
peace conference the previous May. Perhaps Pius XII believed he could better negotiate with the 
European rivals without an isolationist transatlantic partner, or perhaps he simply wanted the 
glory of brokering peace all to himself. Regardless of the reasons for the Vatican's odd behavior, 
the Cnited States remained eager to assist in the peace efforts of the Holy See. With war finally a 
reality, Roosevelt opted to send a delegate to Rome, and Pius XII recognized he needed the help 
of the Americans to limit the war. \X'hen Myron Taylor arrived at the Vatican, a fresh period of 
collabomtion was set to begin between the two neutrals. 
As if he were an actual ambassador, Myron Taylor presented his credentials to the Pope 
in February 1940. Taylor's mission was to apprise Roosevelt of the possibility of promoting a 
negotiated peace to conclude the war and, if no possibility existed, if the United States could exert 
its int1uence on Mussolini to prevent his entry into the war.26 Ending the war as soon as possible 
remained the Vatican's first priority, but a tour of the European capitals by Sumner Welles-
including a meeting with Pius XII-led the American Under-Secretary of State to determine that 
this was not feasible.27 As a result, the United States and the Vatican agreed to put all of their 
weight into maintaining Italy's neutrality. 
Taylor enjoyed privileged access to the Pontiff. He met with Pius XII seven times 
during his initial stay in Rome from February 27 to May 23, a highly unusual number of audiences 
in such a short span of time.28 As the Vatican was surrounded by nations either at war or 
preparing for hostilities, it is no surprise that the American envoy curried special favor with the 
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Holy See. At the March 18 audience in which Sumner Welles also attended, the Pope told the 
American diplomats that he believed President Roosevelt's personal intercession would have a 
very positive impact on Italy's dictator.29 Welles was much more skeptical of a push by the neutral 
leaders because he had no reason to believe the antiwar stances of the Church, Italian Foreign 
Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano, or the Italian public in general meant anything to Mussolini, 
much less the pleadings of a distant leader who had done little to demonstrate that his nation was 
willing to get involved.3° Afterwards, when Welles met with Vatican Secretary of State Maglione, 
the latter confided that any peace overtures to Germany and Italy would be rebuffed because the 
two nations were certain of complete victory at this point in the war. Welles agreed with the 
Cardinal's assessment.31 The gloomy outlooks of the diplomats were being validated as Mussolini 
and Hitler discussed their plans at the same time as the Vatican-American meetings, and the Duce 
declared his intention to take Italy to war when the time was right.32 
Despite the pessimism of Welles and blissfully ignorant of the details of the summit 
between the two fascist dictators, Pope Pius XII and President Roosevelt pressed forward in 
pressuring Mussolini. In the spirit of open exchanges of ideas, Maglione suggested to Myron 
Taylor a relaxing of the Atlantic blockade so Italy would have a window to the ocean, as well as 
for the Americans to make concrete proposals rather than simply indicate a willingness to 
negotiate. The President's representative agreed on both points and promised to advise his 
superiors.33 Roosevelt, however, expected a mutual partnership. Rather than taking all action by 
himself, the President was confident that joining forces with the Pope would apply the right 
amount of pressure to keep Mussolini from becoming a belligerent.34 The Pope agreed to take a 
"parallel action" if Roosevelt made a personal appeal to the Duce, but he asked for his role to be 
kept quiet in order to maintain the Vatican's neutral status.35 Pius XII wanted his actions to 
appear to be independent of America's, a nation which openly voiced its sympathies for their 
fellow democracies in Great Britain and France, fearing such collaboration could result in 
retribution against the Church in both Germany and Italy. 
Roosevelt and the Pontiff simultaneously appealed to Mussolini to keep Italy peaceful 
by tag-teaming him with flattery. In the Pope's letter dated April 24, Pius XII praised Italy's 
dictator for his efforts "to avoid and then to localise the war," attributing to him "the high merit 
of having contained the calamiry with certain limits." The Holy See then trusted Mussolini would 
continue his policies, and therefore "Europe may be saved from greater ruins and grief; and in 
29 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
Diplomatic Papers, 1940, 5 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1958), "Welles to Roosevelt, 18 March 1940," vol. 1, 
107. 
30 Elisa A. Carrillo, "Italy, the Holy See and the United States, 
1939-1945," in Papal Diplomacy in the Modern Age, ed. Peter C. Kent 
and John F. Pollard (Westport, CN: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 138. 
31 
"Cardinal Maglione's Notes, 18 March 1940," The Holy 
See, vol. 1, 375. 
32 Ibid. 
33 
"Cardinal Maglione's Notes, 2 May 1940," The Holy See, 
vol. 1, 404. 
34 Flynn, Roosevelt and Romanism, 117. 
35 Tittmann, inside the Vatican, 12. 
60 
particular Your and Our beloved country may be saved from this calamity."36 Likewise, in the 
letter Ambassador William Phillips read to Mussolini one week later, President Roosevelt 
commended the dictator's promotions of peace, but the letter also possessed a caveat which 
tacitly threatened the intervention of the United States if fascism continued its quest for world 
dominationY 
The Duce appeared to be genuinely happy to receive the note of gratitude when he 
responded to Pius XII on April 30. He gave no assurance of remaining peaceful, however, stating 
that the situation was dependent upon "the vil'ill and the intention of third parties," conveniently 
placing the onus of Italy's status on the British and the French.38 Mussolini issued a much more 
curt response to the American President, saying that no guarantee of peace could be made until 
basic issues concerning Italian liberty had been resolved, and he told Roosevelt to mind his own 
business and stay out of European affairs.39 Such an undiplomatic response might have brought 
an end to American pressure on Mussolini had Pius XII not implored President Roosevelt to 
continue pressuring the Italian leader. Keeping Italy neutral received all the more importance 
when Germany invaded Belgium and the Netherlands on May 10 to begin its Western offensive. 
RooseYelt sent another three messages on May 14, May 27, and May 31, but these were given to 
Italian Foreign .Minister Ciano because Mussolini refused to receive Ambassador Phillips.4o 
Despite being rebuffed on each attempt, some in Washington recommended another try, and a 
draft '-''aS composed but never sent.41 
The efforts of both the Pope and President Roosevelt failed when Mussolini 
announced on June 10 that Italy would enter the war the tollowing day. The declaration caught 
neither neutral by surprise. Sumner Welles, as mentioned above, had possessed little faith in the 
diplomatic overtures being successful since the plan's genesis, and by the middle of May, Vatican 
Secretary of State Maglione had also lost all hope of keeping Italy neutral.42 Pius XII himself had 
told Myron Taylor on May 23 of his belief that Mussolini would enter the war within three weeks 
of their meeting.43 
In examining the onslaught of pleas to Mussolini, it is curious Pius XII and Cardinal 
.Maglione were content to let the Americans assume the primary burden of keeping Italy out of 
the war. Roosevelt personally sent four notes on the subject, and it should be recalled that 
Maglione requested a rela.xation of the Atlantic blockade of the Meditertanean Sea. There is no 
reason to believe that the Vatican was not serious about maintaining Italian neutrality, but the 
Pope's single letter seems a meager contribution when compared to Roosevelt's efforts. The 
reason for this, the Pontiff intimated to Taylor on May 23, was because he had lost his influence 
on the Duce.44 This claim certainly had validity. As early as April 25, l\lussolini proclaimed in a 
36 
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speech, "The Vatican is the chronic appendicitis of Italy," weakening the country each day.45 The 
Pope did little to assuage Mussolini's vitriolic sentiment. When the Vatican received intelligence 
that Germany was preparing to invade Holland and Belgium in early May, the Pope sent those 
two nations warnings to prepare, but the messages were deciphered by Italian intelligence.46 A 
furious Mussolini effectively severed his ties to the Vatican. Regardless, the Vatican possessed 
intermediaries in the Italian Foreign Ministry to send its messages just as the Americans passed 
Roosevelt's messages to the Italian Foreign Minister. After all, Roosevelt had little reason for 
hope, either, but he exerted his energies for peace until the last possible moment. It does not 
speak well for His Holiness to have ceased his efforts so quickly. 
The only other possible explanation in his defense is that he was losing the propaganda 
battle against Mussolini, and he feared a further erosion of his leadership among Italian Catholics. 
On the streets of Rome, marching youth chanted, "Down with the Pope," and Mussolini banned 
the influential Vatican newspaper, L'Osseroatore Romano, beyond the walls of the Vatican.47 Perhaps 
Pius XII believed he could not lead if no one would follow. Whatever the reason for the Pope's 
reticence, his inaction sharply contrasted with his predecessor who damned the consequences and 
tirelessly championed peace. 
Italy's new status as a belligerent devastated the Vatican. Because the city-state inside 
Rome was encapsulated by a nation at war, Church officials worried that the Vatican might be 
overrun by Mussolini's forces or could suffer damage from Allied bombing raids or Rome.4B Even 
worse in the eyes of the Pope and Secretary of State Maglione, the Vatican's prestige and 
importance diminished on the world stage. -!9 If the Pope could not convince Catholic Italy to 
ignore the call to arms, what other nation would listen to his appeals for peace? 
Pius XII despaired. The Axis Powers were dominating the battlefield in the summer of 
1940, conquering France and forcing Britain back to the home island at Dunkirk, and the United 
States appeared to have no interest in intervening despite assurances to the contrary. The Pope's 
spirits flagged under the possibility of Nazi victory, requiring President Roosevelt to write a letter 
of encouragement asserting, "The whole world needs You in its search for peace and good will."50 
Pius XII desperately wanted an end to hostilities and death-although he regrettably was not 
willing to speak as vociferously as his predecessor had-but he felt his opportunity had passed. 
The close relationship he had enjoyed with the United States became estranged but for sporadic 
notes of enquiry on benign matters. His Holiness was looking for an event in which he could 
reassert his leadership in the international community. When he got his second chance a year 
later, the Pope was hesitant to seize it. 
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Hitler changed the tide of the war when he opened the Eastern front by invading the 
Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Just as it did in Western Europe, the German army continued its 
rapid-paced assaults to which the Soviets slowly reacted. It appeared that the German juggernaut 
would achieve success in Stalin's land, quickly laying siege to Leningrad and Moscow by October. 
Onlv the brutal Russian winter slowed the advance. 
· The Soviets desperately needed supplies from the West, and President Roosevelt was 
fully prepared to offer the Communists assistance through the Lend-Lease program which had 
already been extended to the British. Anticommunist sentiment in America, however, presented a 
major stumbling block to aiding the Soviets, led particularly by the Catholic Church. It must be 
recalled that Pope Pius XI had condemned any measure of aid only four years before the invasion 
of the Soviet Union, and the majority of the American hierarchy, which was already strongly 
isolationist (and several who were strongly anti-Roosevelt in general), intended to rigidly follow 
the late Pontiff's encyclical and instruct their congregations to do the same. Roosevelt, looking to 
acquire broad support on the matter, sought to capitalize on the rapport built with the Vatican 
over the course of a year and a half and convince Pius XII of the necessity of helping the 
Communists at this critical juncture. This was not an easy sell. 
First, a Pope dismissing the teachings of a predecessor is rarely done; in fact, such 
teachings of an encyclical are usually built upon further. The more prevalent problem facing 
Roosevelt, however, was that he assumed the Vatican viewed Nazism as worse than Communism, 
which was not necessarily the case. \l{;'hereas Pius XII grew increasingly apprehensive about the 
treatment of the Church in Germany, he looked to the Soviet Union and saw a full-blown 
offensive against the Catholic Church.5 1 The only thing more disconcerting to the Pope than 
religious conditions inside Russia was his belief that should the So·viets achieve victory, Stalin 
would seek to expand Communism and its atheism into Eastern Europe and square off against 
the Christian West in yet another disastrous world war. 52 
Furthermore, plenty of conservative American bishops and clergy had few qualms 
about denouncing President Roosevelt's domestic and foreign policies. The most vitriolic was 
Father Charles Coughlin, a priest in a Detroit suburb whose radio program developed into a 
political rather than spiritual pulpit, and although at first a Roosevelt supporter, his views evolved 
into rage against the New Deal and Communism (and by the end of the decade, the Jews). 
Millions listened to" his program every Sunday aftemoon.53 Another, lesser known priest, James 
Gillis, also used the airwaves to denounce Roosevelt's supposed undermining indiv-idual liberty 
through the creation of the leviathan state and the evil of interventionist policies. 54 \X'hile these 
priests are now considered radicals, mainstream Catholic publications, such as America and 
Commonweal, adopted cautious stances on the president's initiatives.55 
Although generally strong supporters of Roosevelt's domestic programs as part of a 
wave of social justice dominating Catholic thought during the 1930s, the American Catholic laity 
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agreed with the opposition to involvement in global conflicts. 56 Catholics took great pride in their 
religious identity in the 1930s as the Church grew in both adherents and parishes. The visibility of 
Catholics in the Roosevelt administration won the President support, and Catholic intellectuals 
wrote of the New Deal being in line with papal encyclicals concerning social justiceY Thus, 
Catholics were willing to support Roosevelt as long as it did not conflict with Church teaching, 
and this was evident as the laity followed their bishops on the matter of interventionism in the 
latter part of the decade. If Roosevelt could win over the bishops, he would win over most all of 
America's twenty-some million Catholics. 
Yet President Roosevelt had to tread carefully in his courtship of the American 
hierarchy. Protestants maintained their historical suspicions of the Catholic Church and its 
undemocratic leadership under a pope who has the option of invoking papal infallibility. This was 
directly counter to the ideals of a democratic nation. Furthermore, Protestants did not readily 
understand how Catholics could claim to follow two leaders-the pope and the president-and 
therefore the papists "could not be considered loyal citizens of the United States."58 The 1930s, 
however, served as the beginning of the wane of anti-Catholicism in this nation. Roosevelt's 
appointment of Catholic officials did wonders for assuaging fears of Catholics in office, and the 
descendants of the immigrants who were loathed by the Know-Nothing Party of the nineteenth 
cenrury had become established, well-to-do members of society. Although not eradicated by any 
means (recall footnote 24 in which Roosevelt made several conciliatory gesrures to non-Catholic 
leaders for his announcement of the Taylor mission), anti-Catholicism began its decline during 
this period. 
Regardless of Protestant reaction to Roosevelt's overtures to Catholics, there were 
weaknesses in the anticommunist beliefs of the Vatican, and the United States government would 
seek to exploit them in order to secure aid for the Soviets against Germany. Just as Pius XI's 
encyclical forbidding aid to Communists could not be ignored, neither could his encyclical 
condemning the evils of Nazism. The Pope refused to commend the German invasion as an anti-
Bolshevik crusade, and his silence led to accusations by the Axis leaders of being a pawn of the 
Allies. ]\fore than a few leaders in the Vatican administration shared those sentiments.S9 The Pope 
had no intentions of siding for a nation whose religious repression-among other crimes-neared 
Soviet levels.60 Privately, though, Pius XII hoped the Germans would destroy Communist Russia 
and be so weakened in its effort that the West would in turn conquer National Socialism.61 By 
August the Vatican began preparing for the inevitability that the United States would be pulled 
into the war. Vatican Secretary of State Maglione instructed the Apostolic Delegate Amleto 
Cicognani to start informing American Catholics of the religious conditions in Germany to lay the 
groundwork for their support of Roosevelt's evenrual intervention.62 This was not a repudiation 
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of Nazism in favor of Communism, but rather a realistic view given American affinities \vith 
Great Britain and sympathies for the Soviets. The Vatican certainly had to believe it was 
important for American Catholics to support theit leaders rather than be labeled as perfidious by 
Protestant America. 
Pius XII, despite serving as the head of a neutral state, had to decide which ideology 
was the biggest threat to the Church he oversaw, and Roosevelt began the campaign to help the 
Holy See make the decision which would be favorable to the Allied cause. At a press conference, 
Roosevelt astounded those in attendance by declaring that the Soviet Constitution guaranteed a 
religious liberty which was not dissimilar to the religious freedom granted by America's own 
Constitution.63 W'hile his statement was not false, it certainly discounted the fact that it was a 
freedom unexercised under Stalin's regime. On September 3, 1941, the President dispatched 
Myron Taylor to deliver to Pius XII a letter intended to bolster the image of the irreverent 
Soviets. In the letter, Roosevelt reiterated what he said at the press conference: 
In so far as I am informed, churches in Russia are open. I believe there is a real 
possibility that Russia may as a result of the present conflict recognize freedom of 
religion in Russia .... In my opinion, the fact is that Russia is governed by a 
dictatorship, as rigid in irs manner of being as is the dictatorship of Germany. I believe, 
however, that this Russian dictatorship is less dangerous to the safety of other nations 
than is the German form of dictatorship.64 
On the first point of churches in Russia being open, the Pope and Secretary of State Maglione 
found the claim to be entirely ludicrous. Churches throughout Russia had been shut down but for 
one in Moscow and one in Leningrad, and the priests who obstinately practiced their faith in the 
open rather than going underground suffered imprisonment or execution.65 Roosevelt knew this, 
too. A month before he dispatched his letter, the State Department cabled Harold Tittmann, who 
served as the Vatican liaison when Myron Taylor was not in Rome, and told him that the United 
States had no indication of increased religious tolerance in Russia and that there would be no 
pressure placed upon the Soviets to foster such tolerance/•6 The comparison of religious freedom 
in Germany and Russia elicited no response from the Vatican because neither the Pope nor 
Cardinal Maglione knew what to think of one dictator being better than the other-they thought 
both nations were oppressive, but Germany at least allowed religious practice despite e\"er-
increasing crackdowns. RooseYelt's first attempt to win over Pius XII failed, but he persisted. 
The American hierarchy remained virulently opposed to any such aid. Led by the 
archbishops of influential dioceses such as Boston, Dubuque, Baltimore, and Cincinnati, as well as 
the Catholic press, the laity flooded the \'V'hite House and their representatives in Congress their 
own opposition to aiding the Communists. Only a few bishops had the courage to defy the 
encyclical Divini Redemptoris and support Lend-Lease aid to the Sm·iets. The most prominent 
among this small group were Archbishop Francis Spellman of New York, Archbishop Edward 
Mooney of Detroit, and Bishop Joseph Hurley of St. Augustine, Florida. The latter two, 
especially, played a vital role in helping the Roosevelt Administration convince Catholics, 
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including the Vatican, to support Lend-Lease to Russia. Hurley in 1941 had returned from 
working for Cardinal Maglione in the Secretariat of State, and his outspokenness in support of 
intervention in Europe led many to believe he spoke on behalf of the Vatican.6" Archbishop 
Mooney, though, was the first to call for a different interpretation of Divini Redemptoris, arguing 
that the encyclical did not prohibit aid to Russians, just to Communists.6B Despite the efforts of 
these men, they were still being drowned out by rhe much louder isolationist clergymen. 
The pro-administration bishops may not have had a large impact on the laity, but 
others listened and took notice. President Roosevelt and his minions, recognizing that promoting 
Communism over National Socialism failed to make any headway wirh the Vatican, adopted 
Mooney's approach in their courting of Pius XII. In a meeting "~Nirh Secretary of State Maglione, 
Myron Taylor asked for Divini Redemptoris to be interpreted as Archbishop Mooney had su~ested, 
and in a subsequent meeting, Cardinal Maglione informed Taylor rhat rhe Pope had accepted this 
idea.69 Of course, His Holiness requested for this to be done discreetly in order to avoid the 
appearance of collusion ·with the United States. 
The hierarchy received instructions through Apostolic Delegate Cicognani in 
Washington a few weeks after Taylor's meeting to again make it seem that rhis was being done on 
the Vatican's own initiative. The plan called for Archbishop John McNicholas of Cincinnati, an 
outspoken critic of Roosevelt's aid to Russia, to write a pastoral letter for his archdiocese 
elaborating on Pius XI's words which would then be carried across the nation by the Catholic 
News Service in late October.70 McNicholas was chosen because Cicognani believed his words 
would carry more weight than those of a supporter of Roosevelt's. But if the Vatican was hoping 
to spurn accusations rhat it was working with rhe Americans on this issue, rhe abrupt about-face 
of a prominent clergyman should have required an expillnation. To the relief of Pope Pius XII, no 
inquiries were made on the matter, and the letter rallied Catholics behind Roosevelt in the fight 
against fascism. Public criticism among the hierarchy ceased for good in November when the 
bishops at a national conference voted to yield to Roosevelt's leadership on foreign policy, and 
the Vatican let it be known rhat public dissent would not be tolerated.71 It is ironic that although 
Pius XII had a deep interest in preventing the expansion of the war, his greatest achievement in 
his diplomatic exchanges Vil:ith the United States helped another nation enter rhe fray. 
Shortly after the conference, rhe United States ended its neutrality after rhe attack at 
Pearl Harbor. With the Americans at war, the Vatican grew optimistic about the war's final 
outcome as both rhe Pope and Secretary of State Maglione were certain of the defeat of rhe 
Axis.72 The relationship nevertheless changed as a result of America's entry into the war. Over the 
course of the war, rhe United States would protest the Vatican's acceptance of a Japanese 
delegation despite the known atrocities being committed in the Far East, as well as the Vatican's 
small voice in denouncing wartime atrocities in Europe, and Pius XII would chafe at America's 
refusal to rule out bombing Rome during its Italian campaign.73 But relations always remained 
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cordial as a result of the affection the Pope and the President shared for each other. 
\X'as the relationship worthwhile? From Myron Taylor's first audience with Pope Pius 
XII as President Roosevelt's personal representative in early 1940 until the bombing at Pearl 
Harbor in late 1941-not to mention most of 1939---each sought to work in concert and employ 
the moral authority of the Vatican and the ever-increasing military might of the United States to 
influence events in Europe. Of course, the Vatican had no military to back up its words, and the 
Americans were entrenched in isolationism an ocean away; therefore, it is no surprise that they 
possessed little influence. The only instances when the relationship bore fruit were when the two 
neutrals were influencing each other. Pius XII convinced Roosevelt to personally implore 
Mussolini to keep Italy out of the war, and the United States pressured the Vatican to support 
assistance to the Soviet Union as well as to silence critical members of the American hierarchy. 
Despite the limited success in attaining their goals, each needed the other to varying 
extents. The Vatican believed it received instant credibility with another neutral power lobbying 
Mussolini, and perhaps more importandy, it was Roosevelt who encouraged Pius XII in the 
dismal latter half of 1940 to maintain faith that the neo-paganism of the Nazis would not prevail. 
But the friendship with the United States ultimately provided few tangible benefits. Granted, 
Roosevelt was much more active in the efforts to comrince Italy to remain neutral than was the 
Pope, but the President of an isolationist country could not exert as much influence on Mussolini 
as had been originally hoped. The bottom line is that \vith the exception of moral support, the 
Vatican gained litde, if anything, from its relationship, especially after Italy entered the war. 
It is in these terms of tangible results that the United States clearly got the better end of 
the bargain. The disclosure to American Catholics of Germany's religious persecution and the 
Pope's consent to a re-interpretation of an unambiguous encyclical statement cleared the way for 
Catholics to drop their opposition to aid for the Soviets and effectively silenced the Catholic 
hierarchy. The re-interpretation was the coup of the relationship, and it served as the basis for 
historian Owen Chadwick's assertion, "In short, Myron Taylor was sent to Rome for the domestic 
purposes of the United States."74 
Two of the most important neutral leaders in the world joined forces to work towards 
limiting a war both knew would be devastating. In doing so, regardless of which sovereign gained 
the most out of the relationship, they both had crucial needs met the other. Although 
President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII were unsuccessful in their efforts to prevent and then 
minimize a war, the genuine friendship between the two laid the groundwork for future 
cooperation. Before America entered into hostilities, their joint efforts served not only as the last 
hope to save Europe from itself, but also to support each other in their own times of need. 
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